Transnational Shipments of Nuclear Materials by Sea: Do Current Safeguards Provide Coastal States a Right to Deny Innocent Passage? by Dixon, David B
Transnational Shipments of Nuclear Materials by Sea: Do Current Safeguards provide 
Coastal States a Right to Deny Innocent Passage? 
David B. Dixon 
 
Contact information:
215 8th Street SE, 





1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
2. Recent Controversies in Maritime Shipping of Nuclear Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
a. Prohibition of innocent passage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
b. Legitimate safety concerns of coastal states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
i. Responses to sinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
ii. Boarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
iii. Falsified safety inspection record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
3. The “Precautionary Principle” in International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
a. Codification of the precautionary principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
i. Hard law: international and regional conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
ii. Soft law: resolutions, declarations, agendas, and draft articles . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4. Safeguards for Maritime Shipping of Nuclear Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
a. IAEA Safeguards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
b. IMO Safeguards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
a. Innocent Passage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
b. Protection of the marine environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
11. Introduction 
The maritime transport of nuclear materials has created a conflict between two 
international law regimes: the United Nations International Law of the Sea1 (UNCLOS), and the 
developing customary law of the “precautionary principle” in international environmental law.  
This conflict became apparent in recent years when several coastal states denied passage to ships 
transporting nuclear materials arguing the shipments posed an environmental threat.  This 
conflict has raised an issue which is currently unresolved: Do coastal states have a right to 
prohibit innocent passage to ships carrying nuclear materials if these ships fail to fulfill the 
requirements of the precautionary principle?   
This paper will begin by examining the legitimate concerns of both shipping and coastal 
states by describing several of the recent controversies in the transnational shipment of nuclear 
materials leading to the current international legal dispute.  Part Three will discuss the 
international legal basis for the precautionary principle and its several manifestations in both 
hard and soft law documents.  The safeguards regime for ocean shipments of nuclear materials 
will be explored in Part Four.  Part Five will explore the provisions of UNCLOS relating to 
innocent passage and environmental protection to decipher whether coastal States have a right to 
deny innocent passage to shipments of nuclear materials, and if so when.  Lastly, Part Six will 
discuss several recommendations of how best to resolve this real and doctrinal conflict between 
states shipping nuclear materials and coastal states denying passage.  The paper concludes by 
 
1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 (entered 
into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS] available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm (last visited Nov. 
25, 2005). 
2finding the current nuclear safeguard regime does not require shipping states to provide notice to 
or authorization from transit states, therefore coastal states have no legal basis to deny innocent 
passage.  This safeguard regime, however, is evolving and may adopt a precautionary approach 
in the future.    
2. Recent Controversies in Maritime Shipping of Nuclear Material 
The transnational shipment of nuclear materials by sea has encountered much resistance 
from coastal states and environmental organizations over the past decade.  The controversy 
began in 1992 when Japan, France and England began conducting secret shipments of large 
quantities of nuclear material.2 Once news of these shipments was leaked to the public, many 
coastal states along possible shipping routes protested the possibility of nuclear materials passing 
through their coastal waters without their knowledge or approval.  Some states refused these 
shipments the right of innocent passage through their territorial waters; seemingly in violation of 
UNCLOS.3 A few states even prohibited the passage of these ships through their Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZs), an area extending 200 miles off of their shores.4 These coastal states 
have claimed a right to deny innocent passage because the existing safeguards regime for ocean 
shipments of nuclear material do not comply with the requirements of the “precautionary 
principle,” a relatively recent doctrine of international environmental law.5
These controversies are not merely the result of the conflicting international law doctrines 
of innocent passage and the precautionary principle, but are in essence conflicting views of 
 
2 See Jon M. Van Dyke, Sea Transport of Japanese Plutonium Under International Law, 24
Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 399, 399-400 (1993). 
3 See infra Part Five. 
4 See UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art 57. 
5 See infra Part Three 
3national security of shipping and coastal states.  The shipping states have a security interest in 
maintaining secrecy for shipments of nuclear materials and have codified these concerns in 
international agreements.6 If the itineraries of these shipments were to be publicized, they fear 
the ships would be more susceptible to terrorist or pirate attack; potentially allowing nuclear 
materials to get onto the black market and/or be used in making a “dirty bomb,” or that they 
could be victim to a U.S.S Cole type terrorist attack.7 On the other hand, coastal states have 
security interests based on environmental concerns which have also been recognized in 
international agreements.8 An attack, wreck or sinking of a ship carrying nuclear material in a 
coastal state’s waters could have catastrophic effects on their coastal environment and industries; 
 
6 See Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Oct. 28, 1979, art 6, 18 I.L.M. 
1419 (entered into force Feb. 8, 1987) [hereinafter Physical Protection Convention] available at 
http://f40.iaea.org/worldatom/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf274r1.shtml (last visited Nov. 22, 
2005); See also Information Circular, International Atomic Energy Agency, The Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities, secs. 8.1.2(f), 8.1.3, IAEA Doc. 
INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) (1998) [hereinafter IAEA Information Circular 225] available 
at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1999/infcirc225r4c/rev4_content.html 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2005). 
7 See Physical Protection Convention, supra note 5, at art. 6(2); IAEA Information Circular 225, 
supra note 5, at sec. 8.1.1 & 8.1.2. 
8 See Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, arts. 4(2)(f)&(h), UNEP Doc. I G.80/3 (1989), 28 I.L.M. 657 
(1989) [hereinafter Basel Convention]; Bamako Convention on the Ban of The Import Into 
Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, Jan. 
30, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 773 (1991) [hereinafter Bamako Convention] available at 
http://www.ecolex.org/ecolex/en/treaties/treaties_fulltext.php?docnr=3025&language=en (last 
visited on Nov. 11, 2005); Convention to Ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of 
Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes and to Control the Transboundary Movement and 
Management of Hazardous Wastes Within the South Pacific Region, Waigani, Sept. 16, 1995, 
2001 Austl. T.S. No. 17 [hereinafter Waigani Convention] available at 
http://www.ban.org/Library/waigani_treaty.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2005); Information 
Circular, International Atomic Energy Agency, Code of Practice on the International 
Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste, sec. 3, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/386 (1990) 
available at http://www.globelaw.com/Nukes/iaeacod.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2005). 
4potentially devastating their economy, largely based on coastal resources, and crippling the 
health and welfare of its people.9
In order to demonstrate the context of this controversy, this section will provide a 
summary of some of the most notorious events in the transnational shipments of nuclear material 
by sea.  In particular it will highlight nuclear shipments where coastal states have prohibited 
innocent passage because of environmental concerns.  It will also shed light on incidents where 
problems in shipping of nuclear materials have given coastal states legitimate reason to have 
safety concerns. 
a. Prohibition of innocent passage
In 1992, the voyage of the Akatsuki Maru from France to Japan, carrying 1.7 tons of 
plutonium, was the first large shipment of nuclear materials to meet substantial resistance from 
coastal states.10 Despite the fact the route of the voyage was kept secret, many countries on the 
potential route publicly prohibited the ship from taking a route through their waters, including 
Argentina, Chile, Portugal, South Africa, and Malaysia.11 Furthermore, soon before the voyage 
the Caribbean island nations adopted a Declaration on Shipments of Plutonium, banning passage 
 
9 See Jon M. Van Dyke, The Legal Regime Governing Sea Transport of Ultrahazardous 
Radioactive Materials, 33 Oceans Dev. & Int’l L 77, 80 (2002) [hereinafter Van Dyke II]. 
10 Plutonium Shipment Leaves France for Japan, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1992, at 3. 
11 Id.; see also Ruth Youngblood, Japanese Secrecy over Plutonium Shipment Sparks Outcry,
United Press Int’l, Sept. 27, 1992; Lisbon Asks Tokyo to keep Akatsuki Maru Away, Kyodo News 
Agency, Nov. 10, 1992. 
5of all shipments of nuclear materials through the Caribbean Sea and making the region a 
“nuclear-free zone.”12 
Despite the fact that Japan publicly stated the actions of these countries were contrary to 
international law, the Akatsuki Maru nevertheless stayed outside the EEZs of all protesting states 
except for a few Pacific island nations.13 The environmental organization Greenpeace also 
organized large demonstrations at both the French and Japanese ports sparking violent clashes 
between authorities and protesters.  A Greenpeace ship also followed the Akatsuki Maru for 
much of its voyage, and was at one point rammed by a Japanese patrol boat.14 After this voyage, 
the Japanese announced that they planned to ship at least another 30 tons of plutonium in the 
coming years.15 
In 1995, the British vessel Pacific Pintail met even more dramatic protest before its 
voyage from France to Japan carrying 28 logs of high-level vitrified nuclear waste in glass 
blocks.16 Along with the Caribbean states who had already established a nuclear free-policy, 
Antigua, Barbuda, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Uruguay refused to 
allow the shipment through their territorial waters.17 Furthermore, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, 
 
12 See Barbara Kwiatkowska & Alfred Soons, Plutonium Shipments – A Supplement, 25 Ocean 
Dev. & Int’l L. 419, 424-425 (1994) (citing CARICOM Press Release No. 89/1992). 
13 See Plutonium Ship to Pass West of Hawaii, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Dec. 7, 1992, at 1, col. 1; 
Colin Nickerson, Japan’s Plutonium Ship Ends Voyage, Boston Globe, Jan. 5, 1993, at 1. 
14 Id.; see also Andrew Bell, Greenpeace Vessel Hit by Japanese, The Guardian (London), Nov. 
9, 1992, at 7. 
15 Id. 
16 Denholm Bartenson, Nuclear Waste Shipment Leaves France, United Press Int’l [Paris], Feb. 
23, 995. 
17 Id. 
6South Africa, Nauru and Kiribati expressly prohibited the ship’s passage through their EEZs.18 
Due to the protest of the Latin American and Caribbean states, the Pacific Pintail abandoned its 
preferred route through the Panama Canal and charted a course around Cape Horn to avoid the 
waters of protesting states.19 
When passing Cape Horn, however, 30 foot seas and 60 mile-per-hour winds forced the 
captain to find calmer waters within Chile’s EEZ.20 The Chilean Navy and Air Force had been 
tracking the progress of the Pacific Pintail, and once it had entered Chile’s EEZ the Chilean 
authorities demanded that the ship leave their waters immediately.21 A Chilean Navy frigate and 
aircraft intercepted the ship and threatened it with military action if it did not change course.22 
Once it became apparent that armed force was not prudent against a vessel carrying nuclear 
waste, the frigate then threatened to interfere with the ship's navigation by throwing ropes into 
the water to wrap around the its propeller.23 The captain of the Pacific Pintail conceded to the 
demand and returned to the high seas despite the grave risk posed by the rough waters.24 When 
addressing the legal principles for their actions against the Pacific Pintail, the Chilean Maritime 
 
18 See Jon M. Van Dyke, Applying the Precautionary Principle to Ocean Shipments of 
Radioactive Materials, 27 Ocean & Int’l L. 379, 380-83 (1996) [hereinafter Van Dyke I]. 
19 Atomic Ship Breaks Ban, Enters Brazil Waters – Greenpeace, Reuters News Service, Mar. 6, 
1995; Plutonium Ship Will Not Go Through Panama Canal, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Mar. 6, 
1995. 
20 Nuclear Ship Braves Stormy Seas, Defies Chile Ban, Reuters News Service, Mar. 20, 1995.   
21 Helen R. McLeod, UK Could Be Liable If Chile Takes Warlike Action vs. Ship, Journal of 
Commerce, Mar. 21, 1995, at 7A. 
22 A. Suva, Nuclear Ship Chase - Chilean Navy Forces Pintail Out of Waters, Hobart Mercury, 
Mar. 22, 1995.  The article cites a transcript of the radio exchange between the Chilean frigate 
and the captain of the Pacific Pintail:
Chilean Frigate: Pacific Pintail, you could be "exposed to the use of weapons against you 
from navy vessels or air [planes] of the Chilean Navy." 
Pacific Pintail: "I hear your message and with the nature of our cargo I would not think 
that is a very sensible thing to do, to use arms . . ."  Id. 
23 Id.; See also N-Waste Ship Forced Out of Chile's Waters, The Advertiser, Mar. 22, 1995. 
24 Id. 
7Authority cited the precautionary principle and declared that the duty to protect the marine 
environment took precedence over the right of innocent passage.25 
b. Legitimate safety concerns of coastal states 
Despite the fact that the practice of transnational shipment of nuclear materials by sea has 
never resulted in an accident or incident with radiological consequences causing serious harm to 
the environment,26 there is evidence that coastal states have legitimate safety concern from these 
shipments.  Three incidents in particular have put into question the safety of these shipments, 
including: 1.) the lack of response of shipping states to the sinking of a vessel containing nuclear 
material; 2.) the unauthorized boarding of a ship containing nuclear material; and 3.) the 
falsification of safety records of a shipment of nuclear. 
i. Responses to sinking 
In 1997, the MSC Carla, a 25 year old Panamanian-flag cargo vessel, on a voyage from 
France to the United States broke-in-two in 30 foot seas 70 nautical miles off the coast of the 
Azores.27 The forepart of the ship sank to a depth of 3,000 meters carrying 11 tons of cesium, 
having a total radioactivity of 330 terabecquerels.28 As a comparison, the Chernobyl explosion 
 
25 See Van Dyke I, supra note 18, at 387 (citing Chilean Maritime Authority Resolution 
12600/76 of Mar. 16, 1995). 
26 See Raul A.F. Pedrozo, Transport of Nuclear Cargoes by Sea, 28 J. Mar. L. Com. 207, 236 
(1997).  
27 Radioactive Materials – cesium-137 – on broken ship in Atlantic, Reuters News Agency, Dec. 
1, 1997. 
28 G. Sert, The Recovery Radioactive Sources after a Shipwreck: The Case of the Mont-Louis 
Cargo and the Implications of the M.S.C. Carla, 3-5 (presented at the 42nd Regular Session of the 
IAEA General Conference in Sept. 1998) [hereinafter Sert] available at 
http://f40.iaea.org/worldatom/About/GC/GC42/sciprog/gc42-scifor-8.pdf (last visited on Nov. 
11, 2005); See also IAEA, Inventory of Accidents and Losses at Sea Involving Radioactive 
8released 4,800 terabecquerels of cesium into the atmosphere.29 Nether the French or the US 
attempted to salvage these materials because of their depth, and because it was determined the 
potential for damage from a radiation leak was “negligible.”30 The United Kingdom’s Ministry 
of the Environment stated that though corrosion of the stainless steal cylinders containing the 
cesium will gradually wash the radioactive materials into the environment, because of the depth 
the contamination would be “horizontal” and should not affect the commercial species of fish.31 
ii. Boarding 
In 1998, the British-flag vessel the Pacific Swan, sister ship to the Pacific Pintail, was 
boarded by members of Greenpeace in the Panama Canal.32 In the darkness of the early 
morning, activists pulled a boat along side of the vessel and used ropes to climb onto the bow.33 
Once on board, they then hoisted a banner with the words “No Plutonium” from the mast and 
chained themselves to the ship.34 At the time of the boarding the ship was carrying 30 tons of 
Mix-Oxide fuel (MOX), having enough plutonium to make 60 nuclear bombs.35 Greenpeace 
 
Material 20-21, Doc. No. IAEA-TECDOC-1243 (Sept., 2001) available at http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1242_prn.pdf (last visited on Nov. 11, 2005); see also 
Press Release, Nuclear Information Service, Ship Sinks will 11 Tons of Cesium (Dec. 7, 1997) 
[hereinafter Nuclear Information Service] available at http://www.n-
base.org.uk/public/briefing/90_99/brief110.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2005). 
29 Press Release, Greenpeace, Ship Involved in Nuke Accident to be Towed to Spanish Port 
(Dec. 19, 1997) available at http://archive.greenpeace.org/majordomo/index-press-
releases/1997/msg00514.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2005). 
30 Sert, supra note 28, at 3. 
31 Nuclear Information Service, supra note 28. 
32 Press Release, Greenpeace, Nuclear Waste Shipment Enters Panama Canal Flying Greenpeace 
Banner – Stop Plutonium! (Feb. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Greenpeace] available at 
http://archive.greenpeace.org/pressreleases/nuctrans/1998feb62.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2005). 
33 Kevin G Hall, Pana-Mayhem, J. of Comm., Mar. 6, 1998, at 1B [hereinafter Hall]. 
34 Id. 
35 See Earl Lane, Activist: Atomic Waist to be Shipped, Newsday, Jan. 15, 1998, at A19; see also 
Robert Whymant, Nuclear Fuel Arrives in Japan, The Times (London), Sept. 28, 1999. 
9stated the purpose of this demonstration was to protest the shipment of nuclear materials and to 
raise awareness of the threat these shipments pose to the people and environment of Panama and 
Central America.36 Despite its intent, the demonstration has proven that transboundary 
shipments of nuclear materials by sea are vulnerable to pirate or terrorist attacks.37 One can only 
imagine the devastation that could have occurred to the region if the boat which pulled along side 
of the Pacific Swan was controlled by al Qa’ida terrorists, such as the boat used to attack the 
U.S.S. Cole, instead of Greenpeace activists.   
iii. Falsified safety inspection record  
In 1999, it was revealed that British Nuclear Fuels (BNF), the company that owns five 
nuclear transport ships including the Pacific Pintail and Pacific Swan, falsified cargo safety 
inspection records on at least 10 lots of MOX containers being shipped to Japan.38 BNF 
explained that the records were falsified in order to “save time.”39 After the questionable 
shipment of MOX arrived in Japan, the Japanese authorities discovered the inconsistencies and 
demanded the British to take the materials back.40 The MOX was then returned to the UK which 
agreed to pay Japan 6.4 billion yen (approximately 60 million dollars) for damages incurred due 
to the falsification.41 Now that shipping states have demonstrated that nuclear material safety 
inspection records can be falsified, coastal states could be justified for refusing passage to these 
 
36 Greenpeace, supra note 32. 
37 Hall, supra note 33. 
38 Inspectors Sent in as Sellafield Admits to Serious Safety Lapses, The Independent (London), 
Sept. 14, 1999. 
39 New Shipment of Nuclear Fuel to Leave France for Japan, Agency France Presse, Aug. 9, 
2000. 
40 Alan Cowell, Nuclear Plant in Britain Admits Sabotage, N.Y.Times, March 27, 2000, at A8, 
col. 3 (nat'1 ed.). 
41 Japan's Plutonium Policy and MOX Program Full of Contradictions, Nuke Info Tokyo, 
Sept/Oct. 2000, at 1. 
10
shipments for not having adequate assurances that nuclear materials on board have been properly 
examined and authorized for shipping by competent inspectors.  
3. The “Precautionary Principle” in International Law  
Several scholars, most notably Jon Van Dyke of the University of Hawaii, claim that 
customary international law includes a “precautionary principle” which is applicable to 
shipments of nuclear materials.42 The precautionary principle is based on the maxim sic utere 
tuo ut alienum non laedas (use what is yours so as not to harm what is others').43 Under the 
precautionary principle, shipping states have a duty to take several steps before shipments of 
nuclear materials may be undertaken.  These include, inter alia: the duty to prepare an 
environmental impact assessment; duty to notify transit states of shipments in order for them to 
prepare contingency plans in case of an accident or emergency; duty to consult with transit states 
to jointly develop such contingency plans, and duty to mitigate all reasonably foreseeable 
damages.44 This paper will for the most part limit its discussion of the precautionary principle to 
the duty of notification for nuclear material shipping states and its implied or explicit subsidiary 
right of transit states to either give or withhold prior authorization for these shipments after 
notification. 
Van Dyke asserts the precautionary principle allows transit states to require notification, 
before such shipments can pass through their territorial seas or EEZs, and that these states can 
 
42 See generally Van Dyke I, supra note 18; But see Eugene R. Fidell, Maritime Transport of 
Plutonium and Spent Nuclear Fuel, 31 Int’l Law 757 (1997) [hereinafter Fidell].  
43 See Jason L. Gudofsky, Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Waste for Recycling and 
Recovery Operations, 34 Stan. J. Int’l L. 219, 222 (1998). 
44 See Van Dyke I, supra note 18, at 380-83. 
11
suspend the right of innocent passage to these shipments.45 He further asserts that international 
conventions and declarations, as well as the practice of states, provide evidence that the 
precautionary principle is currently customary international law.46 Several states have indeed 
adopted this principle into their laws, requiring either prior notification or prior authorization 
before passage of ships carrying nuclear materials is permitted, or prohibiting their passage 
altogether.47 Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the development of the precautionary principle 
in order to understand its status under international law with relation to the right of innocent 
passage. 
a. Codification of the precautionary principle 
i. Hard law: international and regional conventions 
Though the origin of the precautionary principle can be traced to various international 
agreements,48 including UNCLOS,49 the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of 
 
45 See Id., at 384-85.  
46 See Id., at 379; but see Fidell, supra note 42, at 757 et. seq. 
47 Kari Hakapaa and Erik Jaap Molenaar, Innocent Passage-Past and Present, 23 Marine Policy 
131, 142 (1999); see also Law of the Sea Bulletin, No. 1, at 13 (July 1988) (7 countries requiring 
prior notification: Canada, Djibouti, Libya, Malta, Pakistan, Portugal, and the United Arab 
Emirates; 8 countries require prior authorization: Egypt, Guinea, Iran, Malaysia, Oman, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey, and Yemen; 6 country prohibit passage altogether: Argentina, Haiti, Ivory 
Coast, Nigeria, The Philippines and Venezuela).   
48 Some commentators have suggested that the precautionary principle was first formulated as a 
concept in 1987 in the Declaration of the Second International North Sea Conference on the 
Protection of the North Sea (London Convention).  David Freestone & Ellen Hey, Origins and 
Development of the Precautionary Principle, in The Precautionary Principle in International 
Law: The Challenge of Implementation 5 & n. 15 (David Freeston & Ellen Hey eds., 1996); see 
also James E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining the Precautionary Principle in 
International Environmental Law, 14 Va. Envtl. L.J. 423 (1995).  Others have suggested much 
early origins dating back to the 1969 Oil Pollution Intervention Convention, and 1970 
commercial whaling moratorium proposals.  Philippe Sands, The “Greening” of International 
Law: Emerging Principles and Rules, 1 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 293, 298, 300-02 & n. 17 
(1994). 
12
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel Convention) has 
never the less been generally recognized as the first international convention codifying the 
precautionary principle for the prevention of pollution.50 The Basel Convention provides state 
parties with a basis for denial of passage of hazardous waste shipments if there has not been 
notification provided by the shipping state and prior authorization for the shipment by transit 
states.51 Van Dyke cites the Basel Convention as the primary basis for states to be able to 
require notification and prior consent of shipments of radioactive materials by sea.52 
There is, however, a major flaw in this reasoning.  The Basel Convention does not apply 
to nuclear cargoes covered by other international agreements.53 Therefore, with regard to the 
shipment of nuclear materials, the Basel Convention is preempted by two international 
conventions, neither of which have requirements for notification or prior authorization: the 
International Maritime Organization’s (IMO’s) 1993 Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated 
Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Flasks on Board Ships54 (INF 
 
49 Van Dyke argues that UNCLOS article 221(1) in fact is a codification of the precautionary 
principle.  UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art 221(1).  This article authorizes state parties to: 
“take and enforce measures beyond the territorial sea proportionate to the actual 
threatened damage to protect their coastline or related interests, including fishing, from 
pollution or threat of pollution following a maritime casualty or acts relating to such 
casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful consequences.” 
Id. 
The “acts relating to such casualty” language has given Van Dyke reason to believe that this 
language was intended to give states the right to deny passage to ships carrying ultra hazardous 
materials contrary to the requirements of the precautionary principle.  Van Dyke II, supra note 9, 
at 105. 
50 Basel Convention, supra note 8. 
51 Id., at arts. 4(2)(f)&(h). 
52 See Van Dyke I, supra note 18, at 382; See Van Dyke II, supra note 9, at note 66. 
53 Id., at art. 1(3).  
54 Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive 
Wastes in Flasks on Board Ships, Res. 748, IMO, 18th Sess. (Nov. 4, 1993) [hereinafter INF 
13
Code), amemded to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea55 (SOLAS) in 
1999, and; the 1973 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and other Matter. 56 
The precautionary principle has also been incorporated into two regional conventions: the 
Organization of African Unity’s 1991 Bamako Convention57 and the 1995 Waigani 
Convention58 between the Pacific island nations.  Like the Basel Convention, both of these 
regional conventions require an exporting state to get prior written consent from a transit state 
party before passage of nuclear materials through their waters are deemed legal.59 These 
conventions, however, are different with regard to how they treat the transport of nuclear 
materials.  The Bamako explicitly includes the transport of nuclear materials within its scope of 
obligations.60 The Waigani Convention, however, only addresses radioactive materials with 
regard to invoking a total ban on their import, export and dumping within the treaty area.61 The 
convention also advises member states to adopt the regulations found in the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of 
 
Code] available at http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/infcode1999.html (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2005). 
55 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Nov. 1, 1974, as amended in 
1981 and 1983 with the 1978 SOLAS Protocal, 32 UST 47, TIAS 9700, 14 I.L.M. 956 (1975) 
[hereinafter SOLAS] available at 
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?topic_id=257&doc_id=647 (the IMO’s Marine 
Science Committee and Marine Environment Protection Committee formally decided to add the 
INF Code to this treaty in May 1999, taking effect in 2001).  
56 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters, 
Dec. 29, 1972, [1975], 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1294. 
57 See Bamako Convention, supra note 8. 
58 See Waigani Convention, supra note 8. 
59 Bamako Convention, supra note 8 at art. 6; Waigani Convention, supra note 8, at art. 6.3. 
60 Bamako Convention, supra note 8, at art. 2.2. 
61 Waigani Convention, supra note 8, at art 4.1 & 4.3. 
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Radioactive Wastes, which will be discussed in the next section.62 The acceptance of these 
treaties by their member states does demonstrate state practice accepted as law.  The small 
number of states involved, however, does not rise to the level of opinio juris.63 
ii. Soft law: resolutions, declarations, agendas, and draft articles  
In 1990, the IAEA drafted a Code of Practice on the International Transboundary 
Movement of Radioactive Waste which incorporated aspects of the precautionary principle 
including notice and prior authorization requirements for shipments of nuclear material.64 This 
code makes bold statements with regard to coastal state’s rights to suspend innocent passage, 
including:  
“It is the sovereign right of every State to prohibit the movement of radioactive waste into, from 
or through its territory,” and; “every state should take appropriate steps to ensure that, subject to 
the relevant norms of international law, the international transboundary movement of radioactive 
waste take place only with the prior notification and consent of the sending, receiving and transit 
States in accordance with their respective laws and regulations.”65 
62 Waigani Convention, supra note 8, at art 4.5(a) 
63 As of June 2004, there were twenty-one countries had become parties to the Bamako 
Convention through either ratification or accession: Benin, Cameroon, Comoros, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Côte d´Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Senegal, Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania, 
Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zimbabwe.  See Basel Convention Regional Centre Pretoria, Status of 
Ratifications, at http://www.baselpretoria.org.za/ratifications.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).  
As of December 2002, ten parties had ratified the Waigani Convention: Australia, Cook Islands, 
Federated States of Micronesia, Kirribati, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Island and 
Tuvalu. See Austrsailian Department of Environment and Heratige, International Hazardous 
Waste Conventions, at http://www.deh.gov.au/industry/chemicals/hwa/conventions.html (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2005). 
64 IAEA, General Conference Resolution on Code of Practice on the International Transboundary 
Movement of Radioactive Waste, Sept. 21, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 556 (1991) available at 
http://www.globelaw.com/Nukes/iaeacod.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).  
65 Id., at annex I, sec. 3. 
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This language, however, is qualified earlier in the code where it states that the code is 
“advisory”66 and by a footnote that provides: 
Nothing in this code prejudices or affects in any way the exercise by ships and aircraft of all 
States and maritime and air navigation in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, and under other relevant international legal instruments.67 
It is important to note the specialized agency that regulates safety of transport of nuclear 
materials by sea under UNCLOS is the IMO not the IAEA.  In regulating shipments of nuclear 
materials by sea, the IMO does incorporate IAEA conventions and most of their regulations.  
The IMO, however, has not incorporated the IAEA Code of Practice on the International 
Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste, but instead follows the INF Code to regulate 
nuclear shipments by sea.    
Many believe that the genesis of the precautionary principle as an international custom 
began at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de 
Janeiro.68 The Rio conference indeed was a groundbreaking event for the advancement of the 
precautionary principle.  There, 172 state participants69 unanimously agreed to a Declaration on 
Environment and Development with an implementation agenda, Agenda 21, to put into action 
the Declaration’s principles.70 The Rio Declaration’s principles set out a framework for 
 
66 Id., at annex I, sec. 1.  
67 Id., at n.2. 
68 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, G.A. Res. 228, U.N. GAOR, 
44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1992). 
69 See United Nations Earth Summit information website, at
http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html (last visited on Nov. 11, 2005). 
70 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 
874 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration] available at 
http://www.unesco.org/education/information/nfsunesco/pdf/RIO_E.PDF (last visited Nov. 11, 
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economic development and environmental protection that states are called upon to adopt into 
their domestic legislation.  Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration calls for the use of a 
“precautionary approach” where there are “threats” to the environment, stating: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States 
according to their capabilities.  Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.71
Agenda 21 further provides more specific policy recommendations with regard to taking 
precautionary approaches to “prevent” degradation of the marine environment: 
States, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
on protection and preservation of the marine environment, commit themselves, in accordance with 
their policies, priorities and resources, to prevent, reduce and control degradation of the marine 
environment so as to maintain and improve its life-support and productive capacities. To this end, it 
is necessary to … [a]pply preventive, precautionary and anticipatory approaches so as to avoid 
degradation of the marine environment, as well as to reduce the risk of long-term or irreversible 
adverse effects upon it.72 
Furthermore, the International Law Commission (ILC) has included the precautionary 
principle in its 2001 Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities.73 The Draft Articles have requirements for prior authorization,74 risk assessments,75 
2005); United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, ch 17.22(a), 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/100/Add. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21] available at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?DocumentID=52 (last visited on Nov. 11, 2005). 
71 Rio Declaration, supra note 70, at Principle 15. 
72 Agenda 21, supra note 70, at ch. 17.22(a). 
73 Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, Report of 
the Int’l Law Comm., U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, chp.V.E.1 
[hereinafter Draft Articles] available at 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/prevention/prevention_articles(e).pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 
2005). 
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notification,76 and consultation.77 It is important to note, however, that the Draft Article also 
have a provision for withholding information for “national security” reasons.78 This later 
provision quite possibly will be an opt out provision for countries transporting nuclear materials 
who have steadfastly maintained that their shipments require secrecy for security reasons.79 
Since one of the ILC’s main duties is to codify customary international law,80 the existence of 
these draft articles reinforces the claim that the precautionary principle is in fact international 
custom.  Due to the relative novelty of transport of nuclear materials, however, these draft 
articles most likely are a representation the ILC’s other mandate: to progressively develop 
international law.81 
Though the above agreements are a significant step towards the development of an 
international customary law of precaution, they are not binding international law since they are 
not in the form of a convention or treaty.  Despite the fact that conference declarations, agendas 
and recommendations are not binding international law, they are “soft-law.”  They are 
agreements made by the conference participants or international organizations that encourage 
countries to work in good faith towards the implementation of the goals of the agreements.   
Countries therefore are at liberty to enact the principles into their domestic laws, thus 
making them binding within their own jurisdictions.  If parties to these agreements ignore their 
 
74 Id., at art 6 
75 Id., at art 7 
76 Id., at art 8 
77 Draft Articles, supra note 73, at art. 9 
78 Id., at art. 14 
79 See supra notes 6 and 7. 
80 Statute of the International Law Commission, arts. 1 & 15, GA Res. 174(II), 2 UN GAOR 
(Res.) at 296, UN Doc. A/519 (1948). 
81 Id. 
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obligations, however, there is no penalty for a breach of a soft-law regime.  Furthermore, these 
agreements by themselves are not evidence of an international custom since they are not legally 
binding.  International customary law can only be found when there is a general practice of states 
accepted as law.82 Though the precautionary principle may not currently represent international 
customary law, it seems to be an area of “developing custom.”83 
4. Safeguards for Maritime Shipping of Nuclear Materials 
The current safeguard regime for transporting nuclear materials on board ships is derived 
from a matrix of treaties and regulations developed and administered by the IAEA and IMO.   
a. IAEA Safeguards
IAEA instruments cover the security of nuclear cargoes and the safety of packages 
containing nuclear materials.84 The origin of the IAEA’s nuclear safeguard regime is found in 
article 3 of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).85 Article 3 
 
82 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./Den.; F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, para.77 (Feb. 20, 
1969); Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 
art. 38(1)(b). 
83 See generally John M. Macdonald, Appreciating the Precautionary Principle as an Ethical 
Evolution in Ocean Management, 26 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 255, 255-56, 262-263 (1995). 
84 Alan E. Boyle, Nuclear Energy and International Law: An Environmental Perspective, 30
Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 257, at 261-66 (1989) [hereinafter Boyle] (discussing IAEA's function to 
ensure health and safety in every aspect of the use of nuclear energy).  
85 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, art. 3, 21 UST 483, 729 
UNTS 169 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970) available at 
http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2005). 
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requires each state party “to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and 
concluded with the [… IAEA’s] safeguards system.”86 
Though NPT article 3 generally contemplates bilateral inspection and confirmation 
agreements, it also requires compliance with multilateral safeguard agreements.  The 1979 
Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material imposes the duty to safeguard radioactive 
materials loaded on vessels.87 Article 3 of the physical protection convention provides: 
“Each State Party shall take appropriate steps … consistent with international law to 
ensure as far as practicable that, during international nuclear transport … on board a ship 
or aircraft under its jurisdiction insofar as such ship or aircraft is engaged in the transport 
to or from that State, is protected at the levels described in Annex I.”88 
Annex I provides requirements for physical protection of Category I89 nuclear material during 
transport.  These include: 
“prior arrangements among sender, receiver, and carrier, and prior agreement between 
natural or legal persons subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of exporting and 
importing States, specifying time, place and procedures for transferring transport 
responsibility; … [shipment must be] under constant surveillance by escorts and under 
conditions which assure close communication with appropriate response forces.”90 
The physical protection convention, however, does not require prior notification to or 
authorization from transit states during their voyage.  Article 6 provides that: 
 
86 Id. Though article 3 only explicitly requires non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to submit to 
safeguard agreements, all five nuclear-weapon State Parties have voluntary submitted to these 
agreements.   
87 Physical Protection Convention, supra note 5. 
88 Id., at art. 3. 
89 Carigory I nuclear materials are defined as 2 kg or more of Plutonium, 5 kg or more of 
Uranium-235, or 2 kg or more Uranium-233. Id., at Annex II. 
90 Id. 
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“States Parties shall not be required by this Convention to provide any information which 
they are not permitted to communicate pursuant to national law or which would 
jeopardize the security of the State concerned or the physical protection of nuclear 
material.”91 
Another IAEA convention which touches the issue of safeguards for transport of nuclear 
materials is the 1997 Joint Convention on Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of 
Radioactive Waste Management.92 Providing the only guidance on the subject, article 27 of the 
convention provides: “transboundary movement through states of transit shall be subject to those 
international obligations which are relevant to the particular modes of transportation utilized.”   
In addition to the above conventions, the IAEA also provides non-mandatory 
recommendations for the safeguarding transboundary shipments of nuclear material.  The first of 
these is the above mentioned IAEA Code of Practice on the International Transboundary 
Movement of Radioactive Waste.93 Though this code provides that every state has the right to 
deny passage to shipments of nuclear materials, it later states that the code is subject to the rules 
of the UNCLOS and customary international law.  As discussed above in Section Three, these 
two statements are mutually exclusive.   
 
91 Physical Protection Convention, supra note 5, at art. 6(2). 
92 Joint Convention on Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management, Sept. 5, 1997, available at 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc546.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 
2005). 
93 Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste, P 3, 
IAEA Res. GC(XXXIV)/RES/530 (Nov. 13, 1990), available at 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf386.shtml (last visited Nov. 22, 
2005) [hereinafter IAEA Code of Practice] (providing "it is the sovereign right of every State to 
prohibit the movement of radioactive waste into from or through its territory. "). 
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Lastly, IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material provide detailed 
standards for packaging and shipping requirements in the transportation of radioactive 
materials.94 It establishes a complicated bilateral and multilateral approval system to determine 
which shipments of nuclear materials require prior authorization from transport states.95 Though 
these regulations do require prior notification and authorization for shipments of fissile material 
over a specified indexed amount, the standards for ocean shipments are much less strict than land 
shipments,96 and have many exceptions including the common national security exception.97 
b. IMO Safeguards
The IMO regulations that deal with the transport of ultra-hazardous materials on ocean 
going vessels are found in the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code).98 
Within the IMDG Code are regulations that specifically deal with the transport of nuclear 
materials: the INF Code.99 Both of these codes are now mandatory and are found as 
amendments to the SOLAS convention.100 
94 IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, No. TS-R-1 (ST-1, Revised 
1996) available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1225_web.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2005). 
95 Id., at annex I. 
96 Id., at para 820(c).  Paragraph 820 states “multilateral approval shall be required for: … (c) the 
shipment packages containing fissile material.…  Excluded from this requirement shall be 
shipments of by ocean going vessels, if the sum of the critical safety indexes does not exceed 50 
in each hold, compartment or defined deck area and the distance of 6 m between groups of 
packages or overpacks.” Id. 
97 Id., at annex I. 
98 IMO, International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code pmbl. (2002), available at 
http://www.imo.org/Safety/index.asp?topic_id=158 (last visited Nov. 11, 2005) (including 
Amendment 31-02 of May 2002, which makes the IMDG Code mandatory except for certain 
recommendatory provisions).  
99 INF Code, supra note 54. 
100 SOLAS, supra note 55. 
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The INF Code incorporates many of the above IAEA regulations and provides madatory 
safety regualtions for the shipment of nuclear materials.  Its primarily concern is the packaging 
of radioactive materials and the construction, design, and staffing of the ships that transport 
them.  The INF Code does not, however, address notification or approval of coastal states of 
shipments or emergency response plans, though these topics are being considered for 
adoption.101 Several commentators have expressed concern that the INF Code’s reliance on 
design and packaging safeguards are not sufficient for the dangers these cargos present to coastal 
states.102 
5. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea  
With regard to all things related to the ocean, UNCLOS is nearly universally considered 
the controlling body of law.  It is for this reason that the convention is often referred to as “the 
constitution for the oceans”103 In this section, however, we will limit scope of the discussion to 
the laws regulating the right of innocent passage, including those specifically for ships 
transporting nuclear materials, and the coastal state’s right to protect their marine environment.   
To begin with, it is important to note that “innocent passage” is somewhat different than 
“freedom of navigation” as defined in article 87 (freedom of navigation on the high seas) and 
 
101 IMO, Main Conclusions of the Second Session of the Joint IAEA/IMO/UNEP Working Group 
on the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel (INF) at Sea (26 – 30 April 1993), IMO 
Secretariat Note to the 62nd Sess. of the Maritime Safety Committee, Doc. MSC 62/16/1 (1993)  
102 See Robert Nadelson, After MOX: The Contemporary Shipment of Radioactive Substances in 
the Law of the Sea, 15 International Journal of Marine & Coastal Law 193, 244 (2000) 
[hereinafter Nadelson]; see also Van Dyke II, supra note 9, at 77 & 84.  
103 United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative Process established by the General 
Assembly in its resolution 54/33 in order to facilitate the annual review by the Assembly of 
developments in ocean affairs Third meeting (New York, 8-15 April 2002), para 2, available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/consultative_process/3rdMeetingStatements.htm (last visited Nov. 
12, 2005). 
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article 56 (freedom of navigation in the EEZ - which incorporates the definition of article 87).104 
Freedom of navigation on the high seas is one of the oldest and fundamental principles of 
customary international law.105 Ships on the high seas have exclusive jurisdiction over their 
vessel and crew and thus their passage can not be suspended, except in certain limited 
circumstances where warships have the right to board vessels.106 
The right to freedom of navigation in the EEZ becomes somewhat murky, however, since 
these ships “shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State” with regard 
to environmental protection.107 Therefore, within the EEZ there is somewhat of a jurisdictional 
conflict between a foreign-flag vessel’s freedom of navigation and a coastal state’s 
environmental concerns.  Article 59 states that these conflicts should be resolved through 
principles of equity.108 Nonetheless, it is without question that the right of ships to exercise 
freedom of navigation within the EEZ is no less than their right to innocent passage within a 
coastal state’s territorial waters.  Thus, it is important to understand the law of innocent passage 
and circumstances when coastal states can deny this passage.  
a. Innocent Passage 
The right of innocent passage is articulated in article 17, stating, “subject to this 
Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent 
 
104 UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts 56.1(a) & 87. 
105 See Ian Brownline, Principles of Public International Law 191 (5th ed. 1998) 
106 UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts 92.1(a) & 110. 
107 Id., at art. 58.3. 
108 Id., at art. 59. 
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passage.”109 Article 19 defines “innocent passage” by stating that passage is innocent so long as 
“it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.”110 Furthermore, 
article 24 clearly sets out that coastal states are not to hamper the right of innocent passage, 
providing coastal states “shall not … impose requirements on foreign ships which have the 
practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage; or … discriminate in form 
or in fact against the ships of any State or against ships carrying cargoes to, from or on behalf of 
any State.”111 
The language in article 24 seems to be unequivocal.  Article 25, however, provides that 
coastal states have the right to take measures to protect their coastline “to prevent passage which 
is not innocent.”112 Article 19 lays out a list of activities where passage of a foreign ship shall be 
considered non-innocent, of which the only mention of environmental concern is a provision 
making passage non-innocent for “any act of willful and serious pollution.”113 Seemingly, there 
is a presumption that peaceful shipping of nuclear materials would be considered an exercise of 
innocent passage as long as the intent to voyage was not to cause serious pollution.   
Under article 25, however, a coastal state may “suspend temporarily in specified areas of 
its territorial sea the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the 
 
109 Id. at art. 17.  Article 17 deal specifically with innocent passage in Territorial Seas.  Article 45 
sets out that the right of innocent passage in international straits, where “there shall be no 
suspension of innocent passage.”  Id. at art 45.  Article 52 provides for the right of innocent 
passage in archipelagic states, but provides that these states can “suspend temporarily in 
specified areas of its archipelagic waters the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension 
is essential for the protection of its security … [but] only after having been duly published.”  Id. 
at art 52.   
110 UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art 19. 
111 Id., at art 24. 
112 Id., at art 25. 
113 Id., at art. 19. 
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protection of its security,” and only after such suspension has been “duly published.”114 The 
qualifying language “in specified areas” in this article seems to contemplate limited zones of 
special environmental concern, or areas of military concern, and does not seem to provide a 
blanket right for coastal states to suspend innocent passage from the entire territorial sea as was 
seen in the controversies in part 2 of this paper. 
Most relevant to the topic of this paper are the articles that specifically deal with ships 
carrying nuclear materials: articles 22 and 23.  Article 22 provides that coastal states may require 
ships carrying nuclear materials to use “sea lanes and traffic separation schemes” when 
exercising the right of innocent passage through their territorial seas.115 It does not, however, 
allow coastal states to suspend innocent passage for these ships.  Article 23 states that “ships 
carrying nuclear … substances shall, when exercising the right of innocent passage … carry 
documents and observe special precautionary measures established for such ships by 
international agreements.”116 (Emphasis added.) 
Presumptively, under the provisions of article 23, as long a ship follows the “special 
precautionary measures” coastal states can not deny innocent passage.  But what are these 
“special precautionary measures” and which “international agreements” does this article refer to?  
This language might suggest hope for the advocates of the precautionary principle in that they 
may contemplate international agreements incorporating it.  This, however, is not the case.  The 
 
114 UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 25. 
115 Id., at art. 22. 
116 Id., at art. 23. 
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language “international agreements” in article 23, is a term of art specifically contemplating IMO 
agreements, and most importantly the INF Code.117 
b. Protection of the marine environment 
Part XII of UNCLOS deals with the protection of the marine environment.  Article 194 
provides that states shall take all measures necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of 
the marine environment from any source.”118 Paragraph four of this article, however, conditions 
this right by providing that “States shall refrain from unjustifiable interference with activities 
carried out by other States in the exercise of their rights and in pursuance of their duties in 
conformity with this Convention.”119 
Article 211 addresses the specific issue of measures to prevent pollution from vessels, 
providing:  
“States, acting through the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference, 
shall establish international rules and standards to prevent … pollution of the marine environment 
from vessels and promote the adoption, in the same manner, wherever appropriate, of routeing 
systems designed to minimize the threat of accidents which might cause pollution.”120 
In this provision, however, we once again find qualifying language stating that coastal states 
shall “not hamper innocent passage of foreign vessels.”121 Notice that this article does not 
 
117 See Competent and Relevant International Organizations under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, reprinted in 31 Law of the Sea Bulletin 79, 81 (1996) 
[hereinafter UNCLOS Competent International Organizations] available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/doalos_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulletinE31.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2005); INF Code, supra note 54. 
118 UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 23. 
119 Id., at art. 194(4). 
120 Id., at art. 211.1. 
121 Id., at art. 211.4. 
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provide that coastal states themselves may establish rules regarding prevention of vessel 
pollution, but instead specifically requires states to act “through the competent international 
organization or general diplomatic conference.” This language is a term of art and specifically 
contemplates states working multilaterally through the IMO to establish such rules and 
standards.122 Thus, one can presume that any enactment of the precautionary principle in 
domestic laws, as contemplated in Section Three of this paper, would be suspect under this 
provision.  
Article 221 gives coastal states enforcement mechanisms to avoid pollution arising from 
maritime casualties.  It provides:  
“Nothing in [Part XII] shall prejudice the right of States, pursuant to international law, both 
customary and conventional, to take and enforce measures beyond the territorial sea 
proportionate to the actual or threatened damage to protect their coastline or related interests, 
including fishing, from pollution or threat of pollution following upon a maritime casualty or acts 
relating to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful 
consequences.”123 (Emphasis added.) 
This article provides the most concrete example yet of a justification within UNCLOS of a 
coastal state to use measures to prevent a ship carrying nuclear materials from coming within its 
territorial waters or EEZ.  Notice that authority for state action under this article is justified under 
both customary and conventional international law.  What is meant by customary law here?  
Some scholars have suggested that this language is in reference to earlier conventions on 
 
122 See Competent International Organizations, supra note 117, at 87. 
123 Id., at art. 221.1 (emphasis added). 
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intervention on the high seas which use similar language as that found in article 221, and have 
achieved customary status.124 
For example, after the 1969 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the 
High Seas125 was negotiated, a 1973 protocol was adopted relating to Intervention on the High 
Seas in Cases of Marine Pollution by Substances Other than Oil.126 Article 1 of this protocol 
authorizes coastal states to protect coastal marine resources by taking any necessary measures on 
the high seas to prevent or mitigate “grave and imminent danger to their coastline or related 
interests from pollution or threat of pollution by substances other than oil following upon a 
maritime casualty or acts related to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result 
in harmful consequences.”127 (Emphasis added.) 
Notice also that article 221 deals with both actual or “threatened damage” by maritime 
casualty “or acts relating to such a casualty.”  Commentators such as Van Dyke have suggested 
that this article give coastal states flexibility to prevent ultra-hazardous materials from passing 
through their waters without certain precautions.  Van Dyke writes: 
Concerned coastal nations might view “acts relating to such a casualty” as including foreseeable 
risks created by shipments of ultrahazardous cargoes without proper advance consultation, 
creation of emergency contingency plans, and liability regimes, and hence might view this 
provision as authorizing intervention to block such shipments. If nations with flag state 
jurisdiction do not fulfill their obligations to “take adequate steps to control and regulate sources 
 
124 See R. R. Churchill & A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea 262 (2nd ed., Manchester University 
Press 1988); see also Nadelson, supra note 102, at 205 n. 68. 
125 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution 
Casualties, Nov. 29 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. No. 8065, 9 I.L.M. 25. 
126 Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Substances Other than Oil, 
Nov. 2 1973, T.I.A.S. No. 10561, 13 I.L.M. 605. 
127 Id., at art 1(1). 
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of serious environmental pollution or transboundary harm within their territory or subject to their 
jurisdiction,” then nations threatened by such lack of protective action will inevitably act to 
protect their threatened coastal resources.128
Lastly, the discussion in Section Two of this paper described the 1995 controversy of the 
voyage of the Pacific Pintail, in which it was stated that the Chilean Maritime Authority cited 
the precautionary principle as justification for denying the ship passage.129 According to Van 
Dyke, the Chilean Maritime Authority also cited UNCLOS article 234.130 This article states: 
“Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for 
the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within 
the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the 
presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional 
hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or 
irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance.”131 
Article 234 provides strong support for coastal states to deny the right of innocent passage in 
these ice-covered areas.  Thus, this is one of the very few exceptions to the general rule that 
states can not deny the right of innocent passage. 
In summary, one can glean from the above UNCLOS provisions that despite the fact that 
coastal states have the right to take measures to protect their marine environment, this right 
generally does not supersede the right of foreign flag state vessels to exercise innocent passage 
though coastal state territorial waters or freedom of navigation within their EEZ.  This 
 
128 Boyle, supra note 84, at 269; see also Van Dyke II, supra note 9, at 102; Nadelson, supra 
note 102, at 206. 
129 See supra notes 16 through 25 and accompanying text. 
130 Van Dyke II, supra note 9, at 100 & n. 134. 
131 UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art 234. 
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determination is supported by the writings of many scholars of the subject.132 The only 
exceptions to this right would seem to be if the ships passage was in fact non-innocent by 
intending to seriously pollute the waters of a coastal state, or if the ship was in violation of IMO 
regulations with regard to the storage and transport of nuclear materials, or if it posed an 
environmental threat to an ice-covered area.  There is an interesting debate regarding Article 
221’s customary rights to take measures in the case of maritime “casualty or acts related to such 
a casualty.”  The language of this article, however, provides that states can only take measures 
against such ships if they are “reasonably … expected to result in major harmful consequences.”  
Thus, if a ship has satisfied the inspection regime of the IMO with regard to the transport of 
nuclear materials it most likely would not be reasonable to “expect” harmful consequences, even 
though a possibility of such consequences may exist. 
6. Discussion 
From the above analysis of the precautionary principle, IAEA and IMO safeguards 
regime, and the UNCLOS provisions on innocent passage and environmental protection, is it 
clear that there is a clash of international law doctrines.  It would be difficult to argue that at this 
stage of development of the precautionary principle that its requirements are customary law or 
that they supersede UNCLOS or IMO regulation on the transport of nuclear materials at sea.  
Never the less, there is still the problem of state practice.  There are more than a handful of states 
that prohibit the passage of these ships.  Therefore, this last section will discus how this dispute 
can be equitably resolved.   
 
132 See generally Fidell, supra note 42 (providing a thorough examination on the thoughts of 
scholars on this subject); see also Raul A. F. Pedrozo, Transport of Nuclear Cargoes by Sea, 28
J. Mar. L. & Com. 207 (1997).  
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To begin with, Jon Van Dyke, has provided a wellspring of valid suggestions for the 
international community to resolve this issue.  His most pragmatic solution is for the IMO to 
adopt precautionary principles in the INF Code.133 This solution is consistent with the procedure 
set out in UNCLOS article 211 where coastal states would work through the IMO (“the 
competent international organization or general diplomatic conference”) to create new 
international rules for protecting the marine environment from the harm of ships.  The positive 
aspect of this recommendation is that it is the method for changing the rules recommended by 
UNCOLS, and if (or when) the requirements of the precautionary principle are incorporated into 
the INF Code they become mandatory regulations.  This would at one time change the rules for 
everyone in the shipping community, and thus would be a very efficient solution.  The drawback 
of this approach is that change at an international organization is slow.  Van Dyke made this 
recommendation in 1996, nearly 10 years ago, yet little progress has been made at the IMO to 
incorporate the precautionary principle. 
Van Dykes second proposal is to create regional regimes to enforce the precautionary 
principle.134 This is an interesting option since this is what in fact is taking place as has been 
seen in the Bamako and Waigani Conventions and from the actions of the Caribbean nations in 
their declaration of a nuclear-free zone.  The drawback to this approach is that it creates 
conflicting bodies of international laws and standards.   This conflict would not only be between 
UNCLOS/IMO and the regional regimes, but would also be between the regional regimes 
themselves.  This can already be seen in the different standards between the Bamako and 
Waigani Conventions with regard to nuclear materials.  Carried to its logical end, this solution 
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134 Van Dyke II, supra note 9, at 105-06. 
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would lead to inefficiencies in the shipping community which would have to comply with each 
of the different regimes’ rules as well as the IMO regulations.  Furthermore, it is conceivable to 
suspect that this solution would lead to more legal (or actual) conflict between shipping and 
coastal states, not less.  
Van Dyke also provides a third recommendation: coastal states should bring a case 
against the states shipping nuclear materials in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS).135 This would be the most efficient solution for resolving the currently conflicting 
laws in that it would bring about the most clarity in the least amount of time.  It could also be a 
double edged sward for proponents of the precautionary principle.  One can imagine the judges 
ruling in favor of the laws as set out in UNCLOS and the INF Code since they are the more 
established and clearer standards of international law.  On the other hand, ITLOS could use its 
equity power to require the IMO to adopt the precautionary principle in order to calm the valid 
security concerns of coastal states and end the controversy once and for all. 
Another interesting suggestion is the creation of a “universal sea lane” for the shipment 
of nuclear materials.136 This solution would maintain the status quo regarding the lack of clarity 
in international law, but would also create an interim option to facilitate shipping while allowing 
coastal states to prohibit passage.  Though this is a novel idea, in practice it would seem to be a 
difficult undertaking to negotiate such an agreement between shipping and coastal states.  To 
begin with, where would this sea lane be located?  Coastal states would likely all have the same 
opinion for such an agreement: we support it as long as the route doesn’t pass through our 
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waters.  This ‘not in my back yard’ mentality would likely stall such an agreement indefinitely.  
Furthermore, shipping states would most likely be wary of such an idea because of their interest 
in secrecy and unpredictability to protect national security.  The use of a single sea lane would 
conceivably create predictable patterns of transport that could be exploited by pirates and/or 
terrorists groups.   
7. Conclusion   
In light of the recent controversies in the international shipping of nuclear materials, and 
upon reviewing the divergent hard and soft international law within this area, it is clear that there 
is a conflict between the quickly evolving field of international environmental law and the 
established system surrounding the international law of the sea.  How to solve this problem, 
however, is not clear at present.  The existing nuclear safeguards and law of the sea regimes 
provides binding legal provisions and a system of regulation for the shipment of nuclear 
materials.  Furthermore, it seems apparent that the denial of the right of innocent passage by 
coastal states to ships carrying nuclear material is, except in limited circumstances, in violation 
of the existing law of the sea regime.   
It also seems apparent, however, that the drafters of UNCLOS may not have foreseen the 
scale shipments would ultimately take or the potential danger that they pose.  The tremendous 
amount of damage that would occur in the event that a ship like the Pacific Pintail were to be 
involved in a terrorist attack or major accident with radioactive effect is almost beyond 
imagination.  In today’s energy starved world, however, these shipments are most likely going to 
be a permanent part of the landscape of international shipping, and thus will have to be dealt with 
in a safe and effective manner.   
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The requirements of the precautionary principle seem to be a sensible way to ensure the 
safety of nuclear shipments in the future, though opponents would likely argue that they would 
create inefficiencies.  If the precautionary principle is indeed a “developing custom,” it is only a 
matter of time before these requirements will become standard practice.  Therefore, it may be in 
the best interests of shipping states to embrace the requirements of the precautionary principle 
now and find ways to overcome the inefficiencies.  If shipping states wait until being forced to 
comply with the requirements down the road, it will only come at greater expense. 
